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A fundamental belief in professional sport leagues is that competitive balance is needed to 
maximize demand and revenues; therefore, leagues have created policies attempting to attain 
proper competitive balance. Further, research posits that objectives of professional sport teams’ 
owners include some combination of winning and profit maximization. Although the pursuit of 
wins is a zero sum game, revenue generation and potential profit making is not. This article 
focuses upon the National Football League’s potential unintended consequences of creating the 
incentive for some teams to free ride on the rest of the league’s talent and brand. It examines 
whether an owner’s objectives to generate increased revenues and profits are potentially 
enhanced by operating as a continual low-cost provider while making money from the shared 
revenues and brand value of the league. The present evidence indicates that, overall, being a low-
cost provider is more profitable than increasing player salaries in an attempt to win additional 
games.  
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Free Ride, Take it Easy: An Empirical Analysis of Adverse Incentives Caused by Revenue 
Sharing 
The ownership of the Cincinnati Bengals has broken the unwritten contract between a 
team and its fans. The ownership of this organization has actively pursued a course of 
action which has materially indebted itself to the people of Cincinnati yet has failed to 
deliver a competitive product…The ownership of this organization is causing a lack of 
balance in the AFC Central and the NFL as a whole. (Mission Statement of 
MikeBrownSucks.com [Cat, n.d., para.1]). 
During the 1990s, the Cincinnati Bengals of the National Football League (NFL) were 
the worst team in the league, averaging just five wins per season (“Standings,” 2008). Mike 
Brown, owner of the Bengals, is notorious for his unwillingness to spend money to provide fans 
with a decent on-field product (Daugherty, 2008). However, despite their poor on-field record, 
the Bengals were the league’s fifth most profitable team. Further, additional teams consistently 
performing poorly on the field in this timeframe, such as the Tampa Bay Buccaneers and the 
Chicago Bears, were also among the NFL’s most profitable teams (“NFL team valuations,” 
2005). Dallas Cowboys owner Jerry Jones noted his displeasure with teams who may be 
underperforming on the field, while overachieving (compared to league averages) financially due 
to revenue sharing (Helyar, 2006). Achieving the “optimal” level of revenue sharing has been a 
discussion in owners’ meetings as well as in collective bargaining negotiations with the players 
(Weisman, 2006). 
Similar concerns and anecdotal evidence of greater profits from inferior team 
performance exists in other major North American sport leagues. Under Donald Sterling’s 
ownership, the Los Angeles Clippers of the National Basketball Association (NBA) has 
consistently been one of the worst on-the-court teams in the league, yet is reportedly one of the 
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most profitable (Rovell, 2003). Prior to re-signing Elton Brand in 2003, the Clippers had usually 
either traded or allowed their best players to leave via free agency instead of paying huge salaries 
to retain their services (O’Sullivan, 2002; Rovell). Despite more than half of the NBA teams 
making the playoffs each year, the Clippers has only had four playoff appearances since Donald 
Sterling bought the team in 1981. In 2004, Major League Baseball’s (MLB) Tampa Bay Rays, 
though ranking near the bottom of the league in payroll, home attendance, and winning 
percentage, were the second most profitable team behind the Baltimore Orioles, generating $27.2 
million in operating income (Snel, 2005). The Rays’ 2004 profitability was largely due to a $20 
million subsidy provided by MLB’s revenue-sharing program. Further, revenue sharing may 
actually discourage on-field success and hamper profitability. In 2001, 13 of 16 MLB clubs that 
were required to contribute to the revenue-sharing pool lost money at the end of the season. The 
St. Louis Cardinals finished tied for first place in the National League Central division and had 
income from baseball operations of $1.9 million. Under MLB’s revenue-sharing model, the 
Cardinals were required to pay $8.2 million into the revenue-sharing pool. This resulted in a $6.4 
million loss after revenue sharing (Pappas, 2002). 
Articles in the popular press and trade publications have specifically discussed the recent 
profitability “problems” in professional sports and their possible link to league revenue-sharing 
models (Bloom, 2006; Dosh, 2007). In MLB, critics have noted that even though revenue-
sharing dollars are designed to improve team performance, smaller revenue producing franchises 
have spent the money on any set of expenses or even pocketed it as profit rather than improved 
their on-field performance (Bloom; Kovacevic, 2005; Snel, 2005; Weir, 2002). For some teams, 
such as the Pittsburgh Pirates or Milwaukee Brewers, it appears that revenue sharing is creating a 
disincentive to compete for top players. Those teams have received considerable criticism for 
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continuing to decrease their player payroll despite receiving increased revenue-sharing payments 
under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and generating higher unshared revenues 
from new facilities (Dosh, 2007).  
 These anecdotal examples suggest that, in North American sport leagues, it might be 
possible to increase overall net income by fielding a less expensive, and often less talented, team. 
When one franchise in a chain of restaurants, for instance, can maintain or even enhance 
profitability by consistently offering sub-par service because the other members of the chain 
support marketing activities that enhance the brand value, free riding has occurred (Lopatka & 
Herndon, 1997). In sport, if a free-rider could reap larger profits than other teams in its league 
through the decision to decrease operational expenses, the overall brand value of the league 
could eventually decrease. 
 The purpose of this study was to empirically test whether free riding exists in the NFL. 
The NFL was chosen for analysis because it shared approximately 70% of its overall revenues 
among its franchises, a greater percentage than any other major North American professional 
league (Alesia, 2002; Bell, 2004). Just as important is the availability of sufficient NFL data, 
compared with other leagues, to test these ideas. Lopatka and Herndon (1997) specifically noted 
the NFL’s revenue-sharing model’s potential to encourage minimal owner investments in player 
payroll; “indeed, NFL owners have a greater interest in preventing free riding than do owners of 
teams in other leagues because of the NFL’s unusually high level of revenue sharing” (p. 760). 
There is certainly the possibility that other leagues have free-riding franchises that lower player 
quality while generating greater profits, but the NFL’s revenue-sharing model and sources of 
shared revenue (primarily its national television contracts) spurred this investigation. Contrary to 
previous literature, this article directly tests the impact of free riding on team profits and the 
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resulting incentives involved. While revenue sharing is not necessary to cause free riding, it can 
serve to enhance the incentives for owners to free ride. This article shows that free riding does 
exist in the NFL (utilizing 10 years’ worth of team level data), and specifically demonstrates 
which teams are free riding. 
 Specifically, the article is organized in the following sections. First, the literature review 
examines professional sports’ league structures as well as the specific financial information 
pertinent to an investigation of the NFL. Next, the article presents the scholarly literature 
pertaining to free riding in professional sports, followed by a section that develops a theory 
investigating why free riding results from incentives created by the NFL. The article then 
presents and discusses data used to examine the theory. Finally, the article provides data 
analysis, and presents conclusions and a discussion of implications for the NFL as well as other 
professional sport leagues.  
Review of Literature 
Franchises within professional sport leagues operate not as independent organizations 
desiring to completely eliminate their fellow competitors, but as a quasi-socialist franchisee-
franchisor cartel (Scully, 1995). While teams compete on the field, they collaborate in other 
business activities in order to maintain the league’s overall financial viability. If league owners 
did not cooperate, it is likely that franchises in smaller cities would not remain financially 
solvent (Fort, 2003; Harris, 1986; Helyar, 2006). Most North American professional sport 
leagues have adopted certain activities such as joint marketing campaigns, pooled-debt 
instruments, and revenue sharing as methods to prevent smaller market teams from being unable 
to compete with clubs in larger markets (Fort).  
Free Ride, Take it Easy         6 
 
Although all franchisee-franchisor companies retain elements of cooperation and 
minimum standards of performance, professional sport leagues are “peculiar” in that 
performance (defined by fans as wins) is a zero-sum game even though profitability for each 
franchise is not (Fort, 2003). While consistently negative service quality for one franchise in a 
McDonald’s chain will not negatively affect every store nationwide, in North American 
professional sports, a team which perpetually loses can negatively impact the overall financial 
performance of every other franchise - specifically by decreasing overall industry demand (Fort). 
In addition, where the inadequately performing McDonald’s license can be revoked, in 
professional sports, contraction of poorly performing franchises can be met with financial as well 
as legal difficulties (“MLB at a crossroads…,” 2002). 
In North American sport leagues, teams equally share revenue from national broadcast 
rights, Internet advertising, licensed merchandise, and other sources (Brown, Nagel, McEvoy, & 
Rascher, 2004). Franchises are permitted to keep local revenue which is typically associated with 
local broadcast contracts and facility revenues such as luxury suites, parking, and concessions 
(Foster, Greyser, & Walsh, 2006). The NFL shares a greater share of its revenues than any other 
North American league. In particular, where most leagues permit teams to retain general 
ticketing monies, the NFL takes 40% of all ticketing revenue and divides it equally among every 
club (Brown et al., 2004). In addition, since the NFL has no “locally” broadcast regular or post-
season games, all television revenues - which averaged $2.8 billion a year in 2005 and which 
increased to over $4 billion a year in 2006 - are shared equally (Maske, 2005). The NFL 
generates considerably more money from its television contracts than any other source (Foster et 
al., 2006).  
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With such a large portion of shared revenues, many NFL teams have focused their efforts 
toward developing local revenues that they can retain for themselves rather than share with other 
franchises (Brown et al., 2004). In most cases, the most effective way to increase unshared 
revenue is to improve the teams’ facility – specifically the unshared revenues that are created 
through enhanced luxury suite and premium seat sales. This has resulted in teams searching for 
significantly remodeled or new facilities, often financed by municipalities. Even under the latest 
collective bargaining agreement (“National Football League…,” 2006), where poorer revenue-
generating teams are provided a supplement from the top 15 franchises earning the most from 
non-television and ticketing income, facility revenues remain important. The $100 million total 
amount of this new supplement in 2006 was approximately equal to the disparity between the 
highest and lowest team revenues in the league that year (Bell, 2006). 
In some cases, the lure of the new stadium and its unshared revenue sources has resulted 
in NFL teams moving from larger markets to smaller ones based upon a “sweetheart” lease 
arrangement (1995 - Los Angeles Rams to St. Louis; 1995 - Los Angeles Raiders to Oakland; 
1997 - Houston Oilers to Nashville [Tennessee] Titans) (Barrett, 2003; Donatelli, 2003). 
However, by choosing to maximize unshared revenues in a smaller metropolitan area, these 
teams potentially may hurt a shared-revenue source such as the national television contract. In 
addition, other league-wide revenue sources may not be as lucrative without a team’s presence in 
one of the largest metropolitan communities (Martzke, 2005).  
Though there may be attractive options, NFL teams do not have to move to a new 
metropolitan area to potentially increase revenues and possibly free ride. Throughout the 1990s 
and into the early 21st century the Cincinnati Bengals were consistently one of the most 
profitable teams because of high revenues from the NFL’s national television agreement as well 
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as attendance by diehard fans who continued to purchase tickets despite the team's sub-par on-
field performance (Daugherty, 2008). The Bengals also enhanced their profitability by not only 
fielding an inferior on-field product but also by limiting management expenses. For instance, in 
2002 the Bengals had 68 employees (not including players) while the Buffalo Bills had 142 
employees (Monk, 2002). The Bengals small scouting staff of five (two of whom were family 
members), paled in comparison to the 15 professional scouts who were employed by the Bills. 
Moreover, the owner, Mike Brown, doubles as the team’s General Manager. Clearly, the 
ownership presents the appearance that it is not interested in spending money to create a winning 
team (Daugherty). The Bengals’ frugality was believed to be one of the main reasons the NFL 
Players Association demanded a salary floor when the initial NFL salary cap was implemented in 
1993 (“Questions and answers…,” 2006). In addition, the limited staff and the team's poor 
performance caused some fans to launch a negative website titled www.mikebrownsucks.com to 
voice their displeasure. In general (see Table 1), about 28% of a team’s expenses are not subject 
to the player salary floor minimum. In other words, these expenses (team expenses plus General 
and Administrative [G&A] expenses) divided by player costs plus team expenses plus G&A 
expenses are available for the owner to minimize. 
The NFL’s extensive revenue-sharing system permits the Bengals, or any other team, to 
keep only a portion of the revenue that an additional dollar spent on marketing generates. Ross 
(2000) previously noted that even though revenue sharing creates some desirable outcomes, it 
may also decrease the incentives for teams to promote in-person attendance or merchandise 
sales. Free riding under an extensive revenue-sharing system may also result in diminished 
player costs, as the incremental financial effect of improving the team by signing a “star” player 
is shared with the rest of the league. A revenue-sharing system assumes that each team will 
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maximize its fiscal endeavors to procure the best players and field its best possible team. 
However, the background and motivation of each owner is different. For some, the team may 
have been in the family for multiple generations with the team serving as the primary source of 
income (Harris, 1986). Other owners have achieved financial success in various industries and 
their foray into professional sports is primarily driven by glory derived from winning rather than 
the financial bottom line (Wertheim, 2007). Even within the “new breed” of sport owners, the 
timing of their purchase into the league may impact their debt service and, therefore, their need 
to generate immediate financial returns. In addition, for some owners, the desired profit margin 
and/or desire to win may be augmented by public relations considerations (e.g., getting the 
owner’s name in the newspaper, on television). Given the tremendous difference in owner 
motivation and financial backing, it may be difficult to precisely determine if teams are free 
riding or simply implementing predetermined spending levels which will meet financial 
expectations. Regardless of the owner’s motivation, the NFL Players Association (NFLPA) has a 
vested interest in determining if free riding occurs as free riding may artificially decrease player 
compensation as players receive 59.5% of total league revenues under the current CBA 
(“National Football League …,” 2006). 
NFL owners have speculated that some owners are gaining higher profits from their 
revenue sharing by pocketing money that was designed to be spent on improving overall on-field 
quality (Helyar, 2006). A few large market teams have even expressed frustration that revenue 
sharing has resulted in smaller market teams consistently producing greater profits than the 
higher revenue clubs that generated the revenue to be shared (Helyar).1 This certainly was a 
consideration for the NFL owners’ deliberations regarding the most recent CBA and is likely to 
be an important component of the next CBA (“Jerry Jones fined…,” 2009). Determining whether 
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individual teams are truly free riding is difficult given different team’s analysis of individual 
player quality and each team’s desire to implement a specific team-building strategy (e.g., 
acquire free agents, draft players, trade players). However, identifying free riding across the 
league could lead to changes in the overall revenue-sharing allocation as the league would desire 
to have a plan that optimizes revenue sharing without compromising team incentives.  
There have been several studies regarding free riding and its effects upon a variety of 
sport-league operations. For instance, Késenne (2000) demonstrated the conditions that allow for 
revenue sharing to improve competitive balance, decrease competitive balance, or have no effect 
on competitive balance. His model noted that if the marginal impact of the visiting team on 
revenues is minimal or similar across teams, then revenue sharing will worsen competitive 
balance as home teams will have no incentive to improve their quality as their increased 
revenues will be immediately distributed across the league. 
Other authors utilized models to investigate revenue-sharing issues specifically tied to 
attendance by customers who are purchasing because of the presence of the visiting team (Fort & 
Quirk, 1995; Marburger, 1997; Rascher, 1997; Vrooman, 1996). These authors found that 
increases in revenue sharing will either improve competitive balance in a league or have 
minimal-to-no-impact on competitive balance. Fort and Quirk noted that additional theoretical 
and empirical research regarding competitive balance needs to be conducted. 
Szymanski and Késenne (2004) demonstrated that revenue sharing makes competitive 
balance worse. The authors  examined gate revenues and the impact of revenue sharing not only 
on competitive balance but also on the potential total investment in player talent. Their findings 
contrasted with earlier research related to gate revenue sharing and competitive balance in a 
league. Similarly, Palomino and Rigotti (2000) showed that revenue sharing lowered the 
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incentive for a team to put forth the effort (in terms of spending money to improve team quality) 
to win. The authors stated, “… competing hard to win is wasteful” (p. 15). Palomino and Rigotti 
further noted that the optimal level of revenue sharing is difficult to ascertain. 
Although free riding incentives exist in any franchisee-franchisor relationship, the 
literature demonstrates that revenue sharing in sport leagues can enhance the effects and thus the 
incentive to free ride. Mason (1997) described the principal-agent problem inherent in the NFL’s 
structure, noting that interests are aligned quite well because of revenue sharing; however, there 
are still situations where owners’ interests diverge. Mason believed the NFL could not 
effectively merge into a single entity because of the need for contest legitimacy (fan perception 
that decisions are made by one owner in order to defeat another owner). Ultimately, sport 
leagues such as the NFL desire a competitive league with enough revenue sharing to enable 
every franchise to maintain competitive balance. However, the movement of teams to smaller 
markets for unshared revenues - which may decrease overall shared revenues - combined with 
the potential desire of teams with or without new facilities to present a consistently inferior 
(underpaid) on-field product could create a system where revenue sharing is not the optional 
mechanism to maximize overall league financial success. 
Theory 
The structure of sport leagues, the NFL in particular, is complex from the perspective of 
incentives and governance. Most businesses have a single principal-agent relationship where the 
owner (principal) hires employees (agents) to carry out the owner’s objectives. The NFL has a 
dual-layered principal-agent structure, but it is made even more complex by the fact that the 
principal at the top (the league itself) has, as its ultimate principal, the team owners. The 
Commissioner retains considerable power in the NFL, but still serves at the discretion of the 
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league’s owners. In this structure, the league is a principal trying to maximize the net value of 
the owners’ franchises as a whole, subject to some minimal variation across teams. Each owner 
is effectively an agent serving the league’s objectives. At the franchise level, each owner serves 
as the principal and hires employees to be the agents to carry out his or her objectives. There is 
not a true principal at the league level, but instead the group of owners act as their own principal. 
To make a major change in the league, the NFL requires three-quarters of team owners to agree 
upon the change. As Mason (1997) suggested, an individual owner may find it in their own 
interest to relocate to a new city or (as this article analyzes) to offer a low quality, inexpensive 
product. 
Given that there are 32 owners in the NFL with different market sizes, stadiums, lease 
arrangements, fan bases, and objectives, it is not surprising that some owners would be more 
interested in profit maximization while others might want to pursue on-field victories and Super 
Bowl championships. Added to this structure and owner variability is substantial revenue sharing 
across teams. The amount of revenue sharing is an endogenous factor decided upon by the league 
itself. To the extent that winning and profitability are aligned, there should not be a principal-
agent problem of diverging interests (see Vrooman, 1996). However, winning and profit 
maximization are not always aligned (Gerrard, 2005). 
This article examined one principal-agent issue, whether spending less money operating a 
franchise (and being a low-cost provider of the product) is more profitable. Profitability is 
partially based on the brand value and revenue capabilities of the broader league as well as the 
performance of the individual franchise. A single team can spend less money, offer a low quality 
product, but still draw fans and share in the national TV contract revenues, all while lowering the 
overall brand of the league (as Jerry Jones contends). This article does not discuss the effort of 
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agents (franchise employees) in carrying out a team owner’s objectives. An NFL franchise can 
release a football player who is not performing or fire a front office employee who is not 
providing adequate results. Thus, free riding in this context is not about effort, but about the 
active decision to spend less money and earn profits based on the brand of the league as a whole 
and the quality of the other teams in the league. 
Given the structure described above, let ∏ be the objective function of the NFL. The 
league’s objectives are fluid based on the possibly changing objectives of individual owners. 
However, the requirement that three-quarters of owners must agree to a change tempers the 
whims of individual owners, yet makes some optimization second best. Let the league maximize 
∏ ∑ −∏= )))(var(,)(( απαπ ii ,      (1) 
where iπ  is the profit of the ith team. Thus, the league tries to maximize the sum of the profits 
across the teams (total league profitability), but also tries to minimize the variation in 
profitability across the league. The league chooses α  (the percentage of local revenues that the 
franchise gets to keep) in order to allow for there to be enough revenue sharing to keep the 
league intact and prevent any failing franchises. The “–var” shows that the league wants to make 
the variance of profitability minimal (which is equivalent to maximizing the negative variance). 
This is a general formulation of the league’s objective function and does not specify a model or 
how much weight is placed on total profitability and the minimization of the variance in 
profitability. Given that the league is comprised of owners and can only make significant 
changes with an affirmative vote by three-quarters of the owners, the objective function for the 
league is actually quite complicated, and this is just one method of formulating it. 
As an example, in 2001, MLB announced it was considering the contraction of two of its 
franchises. The entire league was not experiencing problems, but some individual franchises 
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were believed to be experiencing financial difficulty. The contraction option was eventually 
tabled due to concerns by the MLB Players Association and other entities but the incident 
displayed how MLB’s structure that limited revenue sharing had a negative impact upon some 
franchises. Therefore, the NFL has multiple objectives including maximizing total league 
profitability (or league valuation), but also upholding financially struggling franchises. 
As described earlier, there are two levels of principals making decisions in the NFL, the 
league level and the franchise level (or each team owner). Equation (1) describes the league’s 
decision objectives. At the franchise level, an owner maximizes his or her objectives which are a 
combination of profits and winning (Gerrard, 2005; Rascher, 1997). Thus, the owner maximizes 
iiiii WV )1( δπδ −+= .        (2) 
iV  is the value to the owner and is a function of that owner’s profits ( iπ ) and winning ( ). The 
parameter 
iW
iδ  is bounded by 0 and 1 and it represents the importance of those two attributes to 
owner i’s objectives. Winning and profits are in different units, but without loss of generality, 
they will both be interpreted as being in monetary units (i.e., one could create a transformation 
accounting for the amount of winning that equals a certain amount of profit). 
The profit function for an NFL franchise shows that the incremental gain from winning 
more games (which is tied to spending more money in this model) is either positive, negative, or 
zero and is thus an empirical issue. Let iπ  be team i’s profit, such that 
)()1()()( jjiiiii WLWCWLN ααπ −+−+= ,     (3) 
where  equals annual franchise wins for team i, N equals national revenues that the franchise 
receives (and is not based on its own number of wins),  is local franchise revenues for 
team i (and is based on the number of wins for the team), 
iW
)( ii WL
α  is the percentage of local revenues 
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that the franchise gets to keep, and  is franchise expenses (which are based on team wins 
under the assumption that winning more games costs more money). Moreover,  are 
revenues received from the opposing team when team i travels to team j’s stadium to play. In 
summary, team i profits from the national TV contract (largely independent of team i’s 
performance), the share of its local revenues that it gets to keep, the share of the opposing teams’ 
local revenues (here designated as the single team j), and team i pays a cost to field a team. 
)( ii WC
)( jj WL
Revenue sharing rules during the 1990s in the NFL put α  at approximately 0.60, 
implying that for each dollar created at the local level, the team shared 40 cents with the league 
or opposing team directly (Rascher, 1997). As in Gerrard (2005), let  
iii WQCC λγ ++= 0 ,        (4) 
where  represents the fixed costs of running the franchise and 0C γ  is the incremental or 
marginal cost of purchasing talent ( ). In other words, iQ γ  captures the additional expenditures a 
franchise needs to spend in order to purchase more talent (i.e., player salaries). There is also an 
incremental cost to winning (λ ), such as bonuses for winning and advancing into the playoffs, 
etc. Equation (5) is )iQ(i WW = . Thus, winning will depend on team quality. 
Similarly, let 
ii WLL β+= 0 ,        (6) 
βwith  representing local revenues that are not tied directly to winning, and 0L  capturing the 
marginal revenue from winning a game. 
 An interesting aspect of the NFL (and other sport leagues) is that diverging interests 
between the league and each franchise (or diverging interests across owners as it were) can occur 
at the high and low ends of expenditures. A free-riding owner would spend as little as possible in 
Free Ride, Take it Easy         16 
 
fielding a team and maximize profits by saving on costs and sharing in the revenues from the 
opposing teams. This owner would place a low valuation on  in his or her objective function. 
This can harm other owners because they will receive less revenue through revenue sharing (and 
the brand may begin to be harmed). 
iW
Alternatively, a high spending owner (who may be relatively more interested in winning 
than other owners) maximizes his or her objectives by fielding a winning team. However, this 
can also diverge from the interests of the league and other owners because in spending more 
money, it can raise the cost of talent by increasing player salaries. This is similar to raising 
rivals’ costs as discussed in the industrial organization literature. 
 An owner maximizes his or her objective by choosing the quantity of talent ( ) for the 
team given the fixed parameters
iQ
α ,β ,γ , and λ . The first order conditions are below. It is 
solved by taking the derivative of  with respect to  (labeled ) in Equation (2) and setting 




0)1( '''' =−+−−= iiiiii WWWV δλγαβδ .     (7) 
Rearranging it as in (7’) below, one can see that the left-hand side is the marginal benefit of 
hiring an incremental unit of talent. That is, one more unit if talent causes winning to rise 
according to Equation (5), multiplied by the amount that the owner cares about profits ( iδ ), the 
percentage of local revenues kept (α ), and the impact of winning on revenues (β ). That is the 
effect on the profit portion of the value function. An incremental unit of talent also improves 
winning (again as in Equation (5), and winning itself is valued by the owner according to )1 i( δ−
. Equation (5) is assumed to be upward sloping, but with diminishing returns (a standard 
assumption). 
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''' )1( iiiii WWW λγδαβδ +=−+ .      (7’) 
The right-hand side of Equation (7’) shows the marginal cost of purchasing one more unit of 
talent. The direct cost (γ ) is added to the cost that is based on winning (e.g., performance 
bonuses or payments for making the playoffs). 
 Before conducting the static analysis, it is useful to consider some special cases for 
comparison. First, if owner i was a profit maximizer who did not care about winning, then iδ  
would be 1 and Equation (7’) would reduce to  (7”). Further, if the convention 
in Fort and Quirk (1995) is followed, where talent is defined such that one incremental unit of 
talent equals one additional win (violating the non-linearity assumption above), then we have 
''
ii WW λγαβ +=
λγαβ +=  (Equation (7’’’). Finally, if we assume that there are no bonus payments for winning, 
then γαβ =  (Equation (7’’’’). The empirical section will test this final equation along with 
direct tests of expenditures on profitability. The more general equations cannot be examined with 
the empirical data because there is no way to distinguish between the talent level of each team 
and its number of wins with the data set being utilized. 
 For a sport-focused owner (one who strongly desires to win), the marginal cost of 
purchasing more talent rises as more talent is purchased. Thus, total player payroll and payroll 
per unit of talent is higher for sport-focused owners. The implication is that there is a tradeoff 
between maximizing profits and winning, so a free-riding owner (whose primary concern is not 
winning, but making profits) will hire less talent than a sport-focused owner or one who cares 
about both winning and profits. This is important because the optimal actions taken will vary 
across owner type. If it were such that winning as much as possible coincided with profit 
maximizing, then there would not be a free riding problem because all owners would try to win 
(and thus maximize profits) as much as possible. This proposition can be seen by noting that as 
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iδ  decreases (meaning the owner cares more about winning), the LHS of Equation (7’) rises 
(because 1≤αβ ), causing the RHS to rise (which is an increase in marginal cost caused by 
increasing the level of talent). Therefore, being a sport-focused owner is consistent with making 
less than maximum profits. 
 A second proposition is that sportsman owners, in their quest to win more games, cause 
the incremental cost of hiring playing talent to rise for all team owners (not just themselves). 
This follows from the same analysis above for the sport-focused owner, only that the marginal 
cost of hiring talent is faced by all team owners. 
 The league chooses the level of revenue sharing according to its optimization problem 
(Equation (1)). Higher levels of revenue sharing (lower α ) correspond to a decrease in the 
marginal benefit from winning (LHS of Equation (7’)), so owners purchase less talent, lowering 
 (which keeps the LHS equal to the RHS). Further, for profit-maximizing owners, this is even 
more pronounced. Comparing Equations (7’) and (7”), a fixed decrease in 
'
iW
α  lowers the LHS of 
Equation (7”) more than Equation (7’). Profit-maximizers react more strongly to increased 
revenue sharing by lowering their talent purchases than do sport-focused owners. In fact, in the 
extreme if all owners were win maximizers, then α  drops out of Equation (7’) and revenue 
sharing has no impact on the decisions of the owners. They all try to buy more talent, bidding up 
its price. 
 Sport-focused owners’ decisions increase the costs for profit maximizing owners, but is 
the opposite true? Do profit maximizers who free ride harm sport-focused owners' profits? This 
is a cross effect of the change in profits for team i from a decrease in talent purchased by team j. 
Using Equations (3), (5), and (6), the derivative of iπ  with respect to  is , which is jQ ')1( jWβα−
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positive. Therefore, a decrease in playing talent by team j (the free rider), lowers the profits of 
team i. Additionally, it is exacerbated by increased revenue sharing (lower α ). 
 In summary, the key theoretical findings are (a) that there is a trade-off between sport-
focused owners wanting to win and maximize profits, (b) free riding by one owner will harm the 
profits of sport-focused owners, (c) higher revenue sharing will cause owners to want to free ride 
even more than they normally would, (d) if teams are profit-maximizing, then the sensitivity of 
winning on revenues (β ) will be equal to the sensitivity of winning on costs (γ andλ ), and (e) if 
the NFL is structured in order to create incentives to free ride or keep costs down, then lowered 
expenses (from player talent acquisition) will raise profits because the revenue effect will be 
outweighed by the expense effect (from winning). Substantial revenue sharing and the existence 
of different owner types across the spectrum of profits and winning causes some owners (those 
who care more about profits than winning) to free ride on the league’s brand and talent in the 
NFL. Two testable hypotheses are summarized in (d) and (e) above. 
Methods 
Subjects 
Annual NFL team financial data were gathered for the years 1989 to 1999 to determine 
whether free riding exists in the NFL. Data were collected from the conforming financial 
statements sent by each team to the Commissioner’s office and released during The Oakland 
Raiders v. National Football League (2001) case. Team-specific financial data included local 
revenues, operating revenues, player payroll, team expenses, G&A expenses, and operating 
profit. Of the 319 available observations, 309 (97%) were useable. More recent data from the 
NFL are not publicly available. There were some critics of the accuracy of the financial data 
(Zimbalist, 2001); however, this information was sent from each franchise to the Commissioner 
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and the NFL Board of Governors (made up of some of the team owners) and was used to set 
NFL policy. As well, its accuracy was not disputed during the trial. 
Variables 
Two categories of profits and four categories of expenses were developed. The categories 
were:  
 Operating profits – profit reported in the league documents 
Calculated profits – operating revenue minus summary expenses  
 Player costs – player payroll reported in the league documents 
General and administrative expenses – G&A expenses reported in the league 
documents 
Team expenses – direct team-related expenses such as salaries and other costs 
associated with coaching, scouting, and training  
Summary expenses – the sum of player payroll, G&A expenses, and team 
expenses. 
In order to compare data reported over the time frame, a second set of financial variables was 
created by transforming the financial data into 1998 dollars. Comparisons could then be made 
across years and across teams, not just across teams for a given year. 
The annual number of wins, home game total attendance (including pre-season games), 
the age of the stadium, stadium capacity for football, the number of major professional sport 
teams (MLB, NBA, National Hockey League (NHL), and NFL) in the local area, and the local 
MSA (Metropolitan Statistical Area) or CMSA (Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area) 
population were used as control factors in the analysis. These data were collected from 
sportsline.com, ballparks.com, the U.S. Census Bureau, and individual team websites. The 
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population entry was created by interpolating data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 censuses. 
Table 1 outlines the summary statistics for these data, and Table 2 provides correlations. 
Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here 
Procedures 
The data were graphically analyzed across the various combinations of profits, revenues, 
and expenses. Given that there are two forms of profit (operating and calculated) and four types 
of expenses (player, general and administrative, team, and summary), eight plots representing all 
combinations of the data were created. To account for control factors that may skew the 
graphical results, locally-weighted least squares (LOWESS) regressions were completed. 
LOWESS regressions essentially run a separate linear regression for each data point using some 
of the other data points right around it. It then plots a line from that regression, slides over, and 
does it again with the next data point, until all of the data points have been analyzed. Given that 
it is a non-parametric method, there are no coefficient estimates produced, but instead a graphical 
representation of the regression curve is created. The size of the group used for each data point 
and how much weight is placed on the closer versus further points within that group is chosen by 
the user. This analysis used bandwidths between 0.4 and 0.8, meaning that 40% to 80% of the 
data are used, centered on the specific data point that is being estimated. Additionally, the 
weighting mechanism chosen is the standard one developed by Cleveland (1979), who first 
introduced LOWESS. It is called the tri-cube weight function and gives no weight to points that 
are a given distance from the data point in question. 
The result of LOWESS is a non-linear regression line that shows small variations in the 
data. Because LOWESS uses standard regression techniques over small subsets of the data, it is 
good at handling outliers by minimizing their effects on the final LOWESS regression line. 
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It is possible that there is a variable that is correlated with both profit and expenses, such 
as market size, that is missing from the graphical analysis (i.e., a specification problem). To 
investigate this, a series of regressions, both linear and polynomial, were completed as well. 
Generally, only reduced form models with statistically significant variables were reported (not 
the full models with insignificant variables). 
Separately, the parameters β  and γ  were analyzed from Equations (4) and (6) by 
regressing summary expenses on team wins to getγ , and regressing local revenues on team wins 
to getβ . The reasons for conducting numerous analyses around the same question is that non-
linear regressions (LOWESS) allow one to see any specific curves or kinks in the data that linear 
regression smoothes over. However, the non-linear regressions are not interpretable in terms of 
incremental impacts (i.e., they do not produce coefficients). Besides understanding what the 
parameters are, this is the first analysis that directly compares profitability in professional sports 
to expenditures. 
Hypotheses 
It is important to note that compared with the NBA and NHL, the NFL has exhibited 
lower fitting models of financial variables. Miller (2009) created empirical models of franchise 
value for the NBA, NHL, and NFL. His goodness-of-fit for the NBA and NHL models were 
around 0.68 and 0.50 respectively. However, for the NFL models, it was less than 0.28. One of 
his reasons given is that there is extensive revenue sharing (driven by the national TV contract) 
that flattens out revenues across teams regardless of the underlying fundamental differences 
across winning and population. Similarly, Alexander and Kern (2004) found a positive and 
significant relationship between franchise values and population for the NBA and NHL, but not 
for the NFL. Low goodness-of-fit for the profit regressions of NFL franchises is not surprising 
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given the previous finding related to the NFL and related to estimating profit functions as 
opposed to revenue functions. 
This notion is related to one of the points of this article, that the NFL purposefully shares 
revenues regardless of the nature of each team’s market or winning prospects in order to 
minimize the risk for franchise owners. The league realizes that each owner is in business 
together (not competitors) in many ways and it is in the interests of the league as a whole to 
minimize the financial risk. Statistically, this causes the dependent variable to have low variance, 
thus there is not much variation for the explanatory variables to explain. 
As discussed in the theoretical section, it is expected that γβ ≥  because the financial 
gain from winning ought to be at least as high as the financial cost (under the assumption that 
0=λ , or that the playoff payments to players is de minimis). Additionally, it is expected that 
γαβ −  will be near zero relative to the size of α  and β  (based on profit maximization) or 
negative in order to keep league costs down. This will also be investigated directly by 
considering the relationship between expenses and profits (is that relationship negative, as 
expected in order to minimize league-wide costs or is that relationship positive?). 
Analysis and Results 
Free riding in a sport league occurs when a team is able to generate increased profits by 
offering a lower quality on-field product. An NFL owner is potentially able to free ride because 
of the NFL’s brand value and its substantial revenue-sharing policy. Figures 1A – 1H contain 
scatter plots of the two profit measures versus the four expense categories using the inflation-
adjusted variables. They also contain a linear fitted line from a linear regression along with 95% 
confidence intervals. 
Insert Figures 1A – 1H about here 
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As can be seen in the figures, franchises with lower player payrolls, lower team expenses, 
or lower summary expenses typically have higher profits. There does not appear to be a 
relationship between G&A expenses and profits. This is not surprising given that the variance 
among teams for G&A expenses is minimal.  
Figures 2A – 2H contain LOWESS graphs of the inflation-adjusted profit versus 
expenses. Since LOWESS is a non-parametric analysis, instead of an equation, graphs of the 
fitted relationship are created. The relationships are relatively linear indicating that a linear 
regression is a reasonable approximation of the true relationship between the variables. However, 
the graph of adjusted operating profits versus adjusted summary expenses is U-shaped. The U-
shape indicates that profit can be made by either free riding via lower expenses or by spending 
enough money to improve winning and attendance so that revenues are increased at a greater rate 
than costs. This is accounted for in the corresponding linear regressions in Tables 3 and 4. 
Insert Figures 2A – 2H about here 
As a variable could be correlated with profits and expenses, a series of regressions, both 
linear and polynomial, were completed. The two inflation-adjusted calculated profits models in 
Table 3 demonstrate that player payroll and summary expenses are negatively related to profit at 
the .01 level of statistical significance. The results are economically as well as statistically 
significant. A $1 million increase in player payroll is associated with an $820,000 decrease in 
calculated profit. This is not surprising since nearly 70% of all revenues are shared in the NFL, 
but no player costs are shared. Thus, purchasing a talented player for $1 million might generate 
over $1 million in revenue. However, most of that will be shared with the league, making net 
franchise profits decrease. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
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An increase in summary expenses by $1 million is associated with a $460,000 decrease in 
adjusted calculated profits (see Table 3). In the regressions, annual number of wins and annual 
attendance were not included since they are intermediate outcomes stemming from player costs 
or summary expenses. Player costs and summary expenses were both positively correlated with 
wins and attendance. Population and the number of major professional sport teams were not 
statistically significant. Instrumental variables regression and linear regression with interaction 
terms were investigated with the results being similar to those reported here. The Ramsey 
RESET test for omitted variable bias was negative. The Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroscedasticity was also negative. Variance-inflation factors were low, showing no 
multicollinearity issues in Table 3 except for the polynomial (last column). 
However, the CMSA dummy variable was significant and positive in the full regressions. 
Finally, as a stadium gets older, adjusted calculated profits decrease by about $160,000 per year. 
As expected and mentioned above, the R-square only explains about 20% of the variation in 
profits. The goodness-of-fit for the adjusted operating profits regressions (columns 3 and 4) is 
higher with R-square of 0.25. An interesting finding is that the regression examining operating 
expenses (last column) is U-shaped (as suggested by the corresponding LOWESS regression). It 
has a minimum at about $115,000 (which is on the higher end of adjusted summary expenses 
across the teams). 
Table 4 depicts the analysis of the variables which were not adjusted for inflation. 
Multicollinearity was significant in Table 4. This is not surprising given the many variables 
increasing over time (simply because of inflation) that would be correlated together in Table 4. 
Table 3 accounted for that by using inflation-adjusted variables. The findings in Table 4 were 
somewhat similar to those in Table 3, but it appears that multicollinearity issues caused the 
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coefficients to be different than those in Table 3 (because multicollinearity causes t-statistics to 
be artificially high, making it appear that a variable is significant, when it might not be). As a 
result, the coefficients, while technically unbiased, have a very broad confidence interval. Yearly 
indicator variables were used to account for the annual growth in overall franchise expenses in 
the NFL, with each being statistically significant (p. < .001), with 1989 as the comparison year. 
The variables of interest, player costs and summary expenses, both had negative impacts on 
operating profits and calculated profits and were statistically significant (p. <.01). The full 
models were all statistically significant and had R-squares ranging from 0.36 to 0.44. The results 
in Table 3 statistically have a stronger fit, but Table 4 is included in order to show how the raw 
data (i.e., not adjusted for inflation) performed. 
Insert Table 4 about here  
There was a clear negative relationship between profit and summary expenses (Table 4). 
Stadium characteristics and a measure of market size appeared to affect profitability, but the 
impact of expenses on profits was greater. An analysis of interaction terms and an analysis of 
polynomials of the different expense categories revealed no significant findings, except for a 
quadratic on Summary Expenses for the Operating Profits model in Table 4. Solving for the 
minimum point on the quadratic leads to a minimum Operating Profits where Summary Expenses 
equals about $93 million. This is consistent with the Figure 2C. 
An examination of linear regressions and LOWESS by year showed similar results. In 
100% of the 44 annual linear regressions containing operating profits or calculated profits versus 
player payroll or summary expenses and control factors, the coefficient on the expense category 
was negative, with 57% being statistically significant. In all 11 of the LOWESS regressions of 
annual operating profit versus player payroll, the slope of the non-parametric relationship was 
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negative. In six of the analyses of annual operating profit versus summary expenses, the 
relationship was negative, while in the remaining five analyses, it was U-shaped. Similar results 
were obtained using calculated profits. 
An analysis of the parameters β  and γ  is shown in Table 5. The simple univariate 
regressions (with constant terms) yielded significant results for both the model and the 
independent variables. However, the models for revenues and expenses have low R-squared 
goodness-of-fit parameters. This is partially because these are single variable models without 
other explanatory variables. The dependent variables were expressed in thousands of dollars; 
therefore, interpretation of the coefficients needs to be adjusted. For instance, during the 1990s, 
an additional win yielded $1.14 million dollars of local revenue but also cost a franchise 
$752,685. Given that 60% of local revenues are kept by the franchise (with 40% being shared 
with other teams), the net revenues from an additional win )*( βα  were $685,573. An analysis 
of equation (4) showed that the incremental change in profits from winning one more game (and 
having to share some of those revenues and incur the full cost of creating them) was -$67,112. 
This was consistent with the findings in Figures 1 and 2 and Tables 3 and 4. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
Discussion 
Across NFL teams, there is a wide range of player payroll costs and summary expenses. 
Based upon the current data analysis, it appears that some NFL owners choose to free ride while 
others do not, with some spending more on players than maximizing profits would warrant. 
Overall, the purpose of the multiple methods used to investigate various definitions of expenses 
and various definitions of profit show that spending less produces higher profits (other than the 
U-shaped regression between adjusted operating profits and adjusted summary expenses). 
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Empirically, the NFL is structured in order to slightly create the incentive to keep costs down by 
spending less. Theoretically, this is consistent with the notion that some teams will maximize 
profits (and spend less) while others will maximize wins (or some combination of the two) 
causing the relationship across the league to be downward sloping between profits and expenses.  
The high spending owners are presumably sport-focused owners. Another possible 
explanation for this behavior is the characteristic of a team’s market. Owners in larger markets, 
more so than owners in smaller markets, may spend more to create higher quality teams because 
it is in their economic interest (Gerrard, 2005; Késenne, 2000; Rascher, 1997). Yet, the 
LOWESS graphs and regressions results show that this is not actually profitable, but instead only 
produces more wins. Only in one case is the profit versus expenses function U-shaped indicating 
that spending a lot or a little is most profitable, but being in the middle between the extremes is 
not. This coincides with the general finding in sport economics research that population is an 
important factor in determining demand. Therefore, an additional unit of quality for the product 
being sold will increase the actual demand for tickets (and related merchandise, concessions, 
etc.) by a larger number in a market with a higher population. Thus, there are more potential fans 
to be acquired by increasing team quality in a larger market. 
While market characteristics do impact NFL profitability, these characteristics do not 
completely explain the findings that some teams spend less on team quality but reap higher 
profits. The correlation between population and team expenses is positive and significant, but 
small (e.g., the correlation between population and summary expenses, team expenses, and 
player costs is 0.13, 0.30, and 0.14, respectively). Also, higher costs in larger population centers 
might simply result from the higher cost of doing business in more urban areas.  
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A second possible explanation relates to each owner’s motivation. Certainly, each owner 
desires to experience on-field success and most owners would like to spend more on team quality 
in order to own a competitive sport team. In fact, many owners are able to spend more because 
they have significant wealth beyond their ownership of an NFL team. For example, Jim Irsay, 
owner of the Indianapolis Colts, sold personal stock and real estate holdings to pay $100 million 
in signing bonuses from 1999 through 2008 (Burke, 2008). However, some owners may not have 
the desire or the ability to utilize outside funding sources. A number of owners have a large 
portion of their wealth invested in their NFL franchise and are more likely to treat their team as a 
profit-maximizing business. These owners might find it more profitable to free ride than to spend 
for a high performance team. 
An examination of NFL ownership during the 1990s demonstrates that free riding 
occurred in specific cases. Two of the teams that appeared to have been free riding the most were 
the Cincinnati Bengals and the Chicago Bears (see Table 6). In 1991, Mike Brown became the 
majority owner of the Bengals, a team that his father, Paul Brown, founded. The Chicago Bears 
were owned by Virginia McCaskey, team founder George Halas’s daughter. It is believed that 
their stake in the NFL constitutes the majority of their wealth (Ludwig, 2008; Mulligan, 2007). 
The Pittsburgh Steelers, to a lesser extent, were also free riders during this time period. The 
Steelers were owned by Dan Rooney, the son of founder Art Rooney. From an efficiency 
perspective, the Steelers were able to succeed on the field (winning 10 games or more in five of 
the 11 seasons) with low expenditures compared with other NFL teams. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
The Tampa Bay Buccaneers were, perhaps, the most egregious of all free riders. The 
Buccaneers were owned by Hugh Culverhouse until 1995, when Malcolm Glazer purchased the 
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franchise. Clearly, Malcolm Glazer does not fit the mold of an owner whose primary financial 
investment is an NFL club as he is the 462nd wealthiest individual in the world (Kroll, 2008). 
Though it appears that some owners of “family-operated” teams appear to free ride for economic 
“necessity,” some wealthier owners may free ride for profit maximization. 
Ultimately, the decision to potentially free ride is idiosyncratic and depends on the 
motivation of each owner. From the perspective of the league, however, having incentives to 
reduce payroll and on-field quality to the detriment of the rest of the league is problematic. It is 
in the interest of the league to establish policies that help keep costs under control while still 
maintaining quality and competitive balance. In particular, the salary cap and revenue-sharing 
policies help lower player salaries and other costs (e.g., team marketing costs). A problem exists 
when some teams are primarily carrying the burden of maintaining and growing the league’s 
brand (e.g., the Dallas Cowboys), while others are harming, or free riding on, the brand (e.g., the 
Cincinnati Bengals). From a league’s perspective, creating incentives to save costs is good, but 
allowing teams to reduce on-field quality to do so can be detrimental. 
Until 2010, the NFL had a policy that forced teams to spend a minimum amount on 
player payroll (along with its player cap) yet free riding existed. With the owners opting to end 
the current CBA (Clayton, 2008), the salary floor and cap have been removed for at least the 
2010 season. With the elimination of the salary floor, additional teams may now be inclined to 
free ride. Ultimately, this may harm the league’s brand reducing the value of the league as a 
whole and the value of its member franchises as well.  
Teams also are not required to spend in other areas that impact quality such as scouting, 
coaching, training facilities, and staff. As it is likely not feasible to regulate all team 
expenditures, another solution, one that the league has recently implemented, is to exempt a 
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majority of some revenue streams from the revenue-sharing pool. The NFL’s policy covering 
stadium-related revenues allows owners to keep almost all of the non-ticket revenue generated 
by the stadium itself. Major League Baseball has enacted a similar policy. By allowing owners to 
retain a majority of stadium revenues, an incentive is provided for the owners to build new 
stadiums. Simultaneously, their motivation to field a competitive team increases so that the 
owner can then leverage the value of the new stadium (e.g., increase luxury suite and club seat 
sales). Other professional leagues face these same problems. However, these leagues share a 
lower percentage of their revenues so the problem is not as severe.  
Ultimately the NFL has been extremely successful since its decision to equally share its 
national television revenues in 1960. John Mara, New York Giants co-owner, stated, “you could 
argue that we deserve a bigger piece of the pie, but it’s the reason that the NFL is the strongest 
professional league on the planet.” (Burke, 2003, para. 4). The willingness to generously share 
revenues amongst NFL owners has contributed to the continual and rapid growth of league and 
team revenues and the league’s brand strength. However, the presence of free riding could 
undermine the league’s financial performance. The new revenue-sharing model that will be 
negotiated beginning in 2010 or 2011 may become even more important to the league as average 
team operating income was reduced 24% since its peak during the 2002 season as a result of 
changes to the model under the 2006-2010 CBA (Badenhausen, Ozanian, & Settimi, 2008).  
Directions for Future Research 
While previous papers have investigated free riding and revenue sharing in professional 
sport, these papers have primarily focused on the impact of revenue sharing on competitive 
balance (Késenne, 2000; Palomino & Rigotti, 2000; Szymanski & Késenne, 2004) and 
attendance (Fort & Quirk, 1995; Marburger, 1997; Rascher, 1997; Vrooman, 1996). This paper 
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has advanced existing knowledge regarding free riding in professional sport by directly 
examining the impact of free riding upon NFL franchise profitability. Moreover, it is the first 
article with such an extensive data set allowing a detailed understanding of which owners free 
ride. Perhaps surprisingly, the free-riding teams are not the ones in small markets. Further, the 
need for expanding research related to free riding was called for by Lopatka and Herndon (1997) 
and Fort and Quirk (1995). However, there remain areas of investigation that should take place. 
The causes of the observed free riding in the NFL should be closely examined especially, 
as the league prepares to negotiate a new CBA and develops a new revenue-sharing system. 
Perhaps there are systematic or structural reasons beyond each owner’s personal ownership 
objectives that result in free riding. An analysis of the degree of revenue sharing each year and 
whether it is a significant predictor of free riding is warranted as well. Similar analyses of other 
leagues would help determine whether free riding is a widespread problem. Anecdotally, it 
appears that Donald Sterling, owner of the Los Angeles Clippers, free rides in the NBA (“#25 
Los Angeles Clippers,” 2008). Various MLB teams also appear to free ride occasionally. After 
its success during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Oakland Athletics cut payroll and team 
quality significantly and business decisions became more driven by the pursuit of profits. Even 
though the team’s performance was poor, the ownership group was satisfied (Lewis, 2003). 
Also, the recent increase in revenue sharing in MLB has uncovered a number of teams, 
such as the Milwaukee Brewers and Tampa Bay Rays, which were receiving revenue-sharing 
money while not improving the quality of their major league on-field product (Zimbalist, 2004). 
For example, the Milwaukee Brewers revenue-sharing portion grew from $2 million to $18 
million between 2002 and 2004. During the same timeframe, the Brewers’ payroll decreased 
from $50 million to $28 million, which was the lowest in MLB (Badenhausen, 2004). The 
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Pittsburgh Pirates reportedly received nearly $18 million in revenue-sharing money in 2005, yet 
the team cut its payroll approximately $25 million between 2001 and 2005. Kevin McClatchy, 
former majority owner of the Pirates, stated that he used his portion of revenue-sharing money to 
pay off existing debts and not to improve the team’s quality (Kovacevic, 2005). As a result of 
these ownership actions and given the drastic changes in revenue sharing that have taken place, a 
longitudinal analysis regarding revenue sharing in MLB needs to be undertaken. 
 The National Hockey League has historically shared little of its revenue. In 2003, it was 
reported that the league shared 9% of its revenue (“How the NFL levels…,” 2003). The NHL’s 
poor economic model led to sufficient revenue disparities between teams to cause a player 
lockout that eventually canceled the 2004-2005 season. Under the new CBA with its players, a 
hard salary cap and floor was implemented as was increased revenue sharing (“Collective 
bargaining agreement…,” 2005). The NHL’s revenue-sharing plan requires teams to maintain a 
set attendance level to qualify for certain revenue-sharing payments. This, combined with a 
salary floor, ensures some effort to invest in team quality. Ultimately, every sport league needs to 
determine the optimal revenue-sharing model to ensure league financial viability while also 
preventing free riding. 
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Endnotes
1 A conversation by one of the authors with an NFL team official revealed that the NFL is 
concerned that certain teams rely extensively upon the rest of the league to generate revenues, 
especially since some of those teams are extremely profitable. 






Variable Minimum Mean Maximum Std. Deviation 
Population of MSA or CMSA                191,638             5,034,051           10,571,507             5,089,432 
CMSA equals 1, MSA equals 0 0 0.5 1 0.49
Annual Wins 1 7.9 1 2.95
Annual Attendance                123,761                481,127                635,889                  80,542 
Year Stadium Opened 192 196 199 16.2
Stadium Capacity                  56,692                  69,785                  92,516                    7,740 
Number of Major Professional Sports Teams 1. 3. 8. 1.
Local Revenues $12,61 $28,61 $83,92 $12,41
Operating Revenues $28,14 $70,01 $189,49 $24,69
Player Costs $14,70 $41,18 $76,82 $14,19
Operating Profits -$13,602 $6,93 $36,50 $7,80
Team Expenses $3,91 $8,57 $19,11 $2,82
General and Administrative Expenses $2,02 $7,27 $29,46 $4,18
Note: All financial information is in $1000s.
 
 








Number Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1 Population of MSA or CMSA 1.00
2 CMSA equals 1, MSA equals 0 0.54 1.00
3 Annual Wins -0.05 -0.03 1.00
4 Annual Attendance 0.13 0.13 0.42 1.00
5 Year Stadium Opened -0.15 -0.29 0.01 0.08 1.00
6 Stadium Capacity 0.30 0.00 0.09 0.45 -0.16 1.00
7 Number of Major Professional Sports Teams 0.91 0.57 -0.06 0.17 -0.15 0.30 1.00
8 Local Revenues -0.01 0.03 0.20 0.36 0.30 0.04 0.00 1.00
9 Operating Revenues -0.02 -0.01 0.12 0.25 0.26 0.01 0.00 0.87 1.00
10 Player Costs -0.01 -0.04 0.09 0.17 0.19 0.04 0.00 0.70 0.91 1.00
11 Operating Profits -0.10 -0.07 0.12 0.22 0.27 -0.08 -0.06 0.65 0.58 0.28 1.00
12 Team Expenses 0.18 0.12 0.02 0.25 0.08 0.24 0.12 0.48 0.60 0.62 0.00 1.00
13 General and Administrative Expenses -0.08 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.12 -0.12 -0.03 0.71 0.68 0.52 0.33 0.43 1.00
  
























F-statistic 14.84**** 12.42**** 28.16**** 11.88****
R-squared 0.21 0.17 0.25 0
Number of Observations 309 309 309 309
Ramsey RESET test F = 0.77 F = 0.82 F = 1.75 F = 1.42
Cook-Weisberg test Χ2 = 0.10 Χ2 = 0.81 Χ2 = 1.30 Χ2 = 1.35
Variance Inflation Factor test Mean VIF=1.08 Mean VIF=1.11 Mean VIF=1.08 Mean VIF=1.11
Dependent Variable Adj. Calc. Profits Adj. Calc. Profits Adj. Op. Profits Adj. Op. Profits
Independent Variables:
Constant -236,978*** -270,217*** -62,597 -127,916
Player Costs Adjusted for Inflation -0.82**** -- -1.84**** --
Summary Expenses Adjusted for Inflation -- -0.46**** -- -1.13****
Summary Expenses Adjusted for Inflation Squared -- -- -- .0000199***
CMSA or MSA 2,690* 3,612*** 763 3,225
Year Stadium Opened 154.6*** 166.2*** 94 119*
























F-statistic 12.36**** 11.60**** 9.62**** 9.72****
R-squared 0.39 0.36 0.44 0.38
Number of Observations 309 309 309
Ramsey RESET test F = 1.58 F = 1.87 F = 2.01 1.97
Cook-Weisberg test Χ2 = 1.42 Χ2 = 1.54 Χ2 = 1.79 Χ2 = 1.01
Variance Inflation Factor test Mean VIF=2.87 Mean VIF=6.52 Mean VIF=2.87 Mean VIF=6.52
Dependent Variable Operating Profits Operating Profits Calculated Profits Calculated Profits
Independent Variables:
Constant -168,299*** -146,546*** -245,885*** -275,407***
Player Costs -0.655**** -- -.935*** --
Summary Expenses -- -1.09*** -- -0.450***
Summary Expenses Squared -- 5.88e-06*** -- --
CMSA or MSA 1,629* 1,346*** 2,434* 3,111**
Year Stadium Opened 93*** 86*** 136**** 149****
Year Indicator 1990 7,150**** 8,495**** 8,307**** 7,210****
Year Indicator 1991 9,267**** 10,835**** 12,872**** 9,944****
Year Indicator 1992 10,456**** 12,334**** 17,350**** 12,630****
Year Indicator 1993 17,708**** 17,381**** 24,752*** 14,186***
Year Indicator 1994 18,166**** 20,132**** 23,790**** 16,866****
Year Indicator 1995 20,312**** 22,389**** 25,573**** 18,171****
Year Indicator 1996 21,382**** 22,340**** 30,218**** 20,750****
Year Indicator 1997 23,257**** 24,749**** 32,351**** 23,577****
Year Indicator 1998 38,501**** 35,332**** 52,456**** 39,469****
Year Indicator 1999 39,599**** 31,872**** 61,352**** 44,132****
Significance: * - 10% level; ** - 5% level; *** - 1% level; **** - 0.1% level.
 
  













Number of Observations 309 309
Dependent Variable Adj. Local Revenues Adj. Summary Expenses
Independent Variables:
Constant 32,420**** 76,496****





                                685,573 
-67,112
Significance: * - 10% level; ** - 5% level; *** - 1% level; **** - 0.1% level.
1 Based on the revenue sharing rules in the NFL during the 1990s.
2 The coefficient on team wins is multiplied by 1,000 in order to account for 
Adjusted Local Revenues represented in thousands of dollars, not actual dollars.
3 The coefficient on team wins is multiplied by 1,000 in order to account for 









Team Ranking of Profit Divided by Summary Expenses (sorted highest to lowest) 
 
 
Franchise and Ranking of Highest Profit Divided by Summary Expenses
Year Chicago Bears Cincinnati Bengals Pittsburgh Steelers
Tampa Bay 
Buccaneers
1989 2 5 6 1
1990 4 6 5 3
1991 2 5 1 3
1992 4 5 3 1
1993 1 2 3 7
1994 2 4 13 7
1995 4 8 11 2
1996 8 6 11 1
1997 15 8 10 1
1998 18 13 10 1
1999 18 14 9 5
 
Note: The NFL averaged 29 teams over the time period. 
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1B. Calculated Profits vs. Player Costs 
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1F. Calculated Profits vs. Team Expenses 
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Figures 2A – 2H. LOWESS graphs of inflation-adjusted profits and expenses. 
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